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94 N.C. L. REV. 1036 (2016)

Casey, Camnitz, and Compelled Speech: Why the Fourth
Circuit’s Interpretation of Casey Sets the Right Standard for
Speech-and-Display Provisions*

INTRODUCTION
In 2014, the Fourth Circuit decided Stuart v. Camnitz,1 striking
down a provision of the North Carolina Woman’s Right to Know Act
that required physicians to display and describe ultrasound images to
women seeking abortions.2 The court agreed with the plaintiffs—
several North Carolina physicians—who challenged the requirement
as a violation of their First Amendment right to be free from
compelled speech.3 Although North Carolina defended the provision
as necessary to ensure that women give informed consent to
abortions, the court found the provision unconstitutional under the
First Amendment.4 By doing so, the Fourth Circuit split with recent
decisions by the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, which upheld similar
informed consent requirements in the face of First Amendment
challenges.5 The precise nature of the circuit split arose out of
differing interpretations of the leading Supreme Court case on state
regulation of abortion: Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey.6 In Casey, the Court upheld an informed
consent provision in the face of a First Amendment challenge by
physicians.7 But where the Fifth and Eighth Circuits held that Casey
required application of the undue burden test to state informed
consent requirements, the Fourth Circuit held that Casey did not
* © 2016 Claire O'Brien.
1. 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2838 (2015).
2. Id. at 242; see also Woman’s Right to Know Act, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 2105, 2109–
10 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85 (2015)).
3. Camnitz, 774 F.3d at 243. Several political action groups joined the suit challenging
the North Carolina law. See ACLU, Planned Parenthood Sue over NC Abortion Law,
WRAL (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.wral.com/news/state/nccapitol/story/10199739/
[https://perma.cc/Q5MD-3V4A] (listing the American Civil Liberties Union, Planned
Parenthood, and the Center for Reproductive Rights as among those challenging the law).
4. Camnitz, 744 F.3d at 245 (explaining that the display of the sonogram is plainly an
expressive act that implicates the First Amendment).
5. See, e.g., Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570
(5th Cir. 2012); Planned Parenthood of Minn. v. Rounds, 653 F.3d 662 (8th Cir.), vacated
in part, 662 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2011).
6. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
7. Id. at 881–87 (plurality opinion).
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preclude the application of a First Amendment analysis when such
requirements compelled physician speech.8
This Recent Development argues that the Fourth Circuit’s
approach is the correct application of Casey: laws that mandate
physician speech in the context of informed consent for abortions
should be subject to a First Amendment analysis. The Fourth
Circuit’s decision not only falls within the bounds of Supreme Court
precedent, but its approach also conforms to the overall intent of
Casey and is necessary to ensure the long-term survival of the
Supreme Court’s existing abortion jurisprudence. Although the
Supreme Court upheld the informed consent provision at issue in
Casey, the North Carolina informed consent provision differed in
several significant respects from the Pennsylvania statute and could
thus be struck down without contravening Casey. First, the North
Carolina provision included no therapeutic exception, denying
physicians the discretion to withhold the state’s message if they
believed the information would put an individual woman’s health at
risk.9 The Pennsylvania statute upheld in Casey contained such an
exception.10 Second, the ideological nature of North Carolina’s
mandated message also distinguished it from the provision at issue in
Casey.11 Finally, the disutility of abortion exceptionalism12
jurisprudence buttresses the Fourth Circuit’s decision to strike down
8. See, e.g., Camnitz, 744 F.3d at 249 (“The fact that a regulation does not impose an
undue burden on a woman under the due process clause does not answer the question of
whether it imposes an impermissible burden on the physician under the First
Amendment.”); Lakey, 667 F.3d at 576 (“The import of [Casey] is clear . . . . [I]nformed
consent laws that do not impose an undue burden on the woman’s right to have an
abortion are permissible if they require truthful, non-misleading, and relevant
disclosures.”); Rounds, 653 F.3d at 669 (“[A] party bringing a facial challenge to an
abortion statute must show that the law presents an undue burden . . . .”).
9. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.82 (2015) (describing the lone exception for a
“medical emergency”).
10. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 883–84 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he statute now before us
does not require a physician to comply with the informed consent provisions ‘if he or she
can demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she reasonably believed
that furnishing the information would have resulted in a severely adverse effect on the
physical or mental health of the patient.’ ”).
11. See Camnitz, 744 F.3d at 242 (“This compelled speech, even though it is a
regulation of the medical profession, is ideological in intent and in kind.”).
12. Abortion exceptionalism is the theory that speech claims in the abortion context
must be analyzed under a separate standard of review from all other speech claims. See
Caitlin Borgmann, Fourth and Fifth Circuits Confront Abortion Exceptionalism, JURIST
(Jan. 15, 2015), http://jurist.org/forum/2015/01/caitlin-borgmann-abortion-exceptionalism
.php [https://perma.cc/A332-K3V7]. The theory suggests that the Supreme Court’s analysis
of the physicians’ First Amendment challenge in Casey was intended to set the standard
for all future speech challenges to informed consent provisions applicable to abortion
providers. Id.
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the North Carolina informed consent provision as a violation of the
First Amendment. The Camnitz decision thus stands firmly within the
bounds of the Casey decision and is sound legal policy. More
importantly, Camnitz ensures the continued survival of Casey’s
underlying goal, which was largely to uphold Roe v. Wade13 and to
ensure continuing access to abortion for women without undue
hardship.14
This Recent Development proceeds in four parts. Part I provides
background to the Supreme Court’s introduction of the undue burden
test in Casey and discusses the rise of informed consent provisions as
a form of state regulation of abortion procedures. This Part also
introduces North Carolina’s informed consent requirement, with
particular focus on the speech-and-display provision and the lawsuit it
provoked. Part II expands on the Supreme Court’s decision in Casey
and the subsequent uncertainty about the appropriate standard of
review for challenges to state abortion regulations. Part II goes on to
contrast the Fifth Circuit’s15 interpretation of Casey precedent with
the Fourth Circuit’s approach in Stuart v. Camnitz. Part III explains
why the Fourth Circuit’s holding is a superior interpretation of the
loose guidelines the Supreme Court provided in Casey, both in light
of key differences between the Pennsylvania and North Carolina
statutes and the need to ensure the integrity of the Supreme Court’s
abortion jurisprudence. Finally, Part IV addresses the Supreme
Court’s recent denial of certiorari on this issue and explores possible
motivations for the Court’s refusal to resolve the circuit split.
I. INFORMED CONSENT PROVISIONS AND ENSUING LITIGATION
Two of the Supreme Court’s most high-profile decisions of the
twentieth century centered on abortion and the extent of permissible
state regulation of abortion procedures. Although Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey nominally affirmed
Roe v. Wade, the decision was widely received as weakening Roe’s
standard for determining the validity of laws restricting access to
abortion.16 Casey departed from the trimester framework set out in
13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
14. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 860 (“[N]o change in Roe’s factual underpinning has left its
central holding obsolete, and none supports an argument for overruling it.”).
15. Due to space considerations, this Recent Development will focus only on the Fifth
Circuit’s recent decision in Lakey as a contrast to the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Camnitz.
The Lakey decision represents the approach taken by both the Fifth and Eighth Circuits.
16. See, e.g., Linda J. Wharton, Roe at Thirty-Six and Beyond: Enhancing Protection for
Abortion Rights Through State Constitutions, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 469, 471
(2009) (arguing that in the decades since Roe, the Supreme Court has “seriously
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Roe and imposed a new test: a state law would be held invalid if it
imposed an “undue burden” on a woman’s access to an abortion.17
The Court described the standard as follows: “An undue burden
exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or
effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking
an abortion before the fetus attains viability.”18 The outcome in Casey
indicated that the new test would be easy for future state regulations
to pass; after applying the undue burden test to the provisions under
review in Casey, the Court upheld all but one.19 But certain language
in the Casey opinion20 has resulted in debate as to whether the Court
intended for the undue burden test to be the exclusive standard for
judging state regulations of abortion.21 Specifically, there is lingering
undermined” the protections Roe provided for women’s access to abortion); Landmark
Cases: Casey v. Planned Parenthood (1992), PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt
/rights/landmark_casey.html [https://perma.cc/DR6R-L7QG] (“The Court also rejected parts
of Roe, holding that the state can legally pass laws protecting the life and health of the fetus
or mother in far broader circumstances. For example, while in Roe the Court had held that
the state could not regulate any aspect of abortions performed during the first trimester, the
Court now held that states could pass such regulations affecting the first trimester, but only
to safeguard a woman’s health, not to limit a woman’s access to abortions.”); Alex Markels,
Supreme Court’s Evolving Rulings on Abortion, NPR (Nov. 30, 2005), http://www.npr.org
/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5029934 [https://perma.cc/6EPE-DPYT (dark archive)]
(describing Casey as “effectively [setting] a lower standard for state involvement in abortion
decisions,” and stating that “Casey significantly weakened Roe”); Jane S. Schacter, At the
Supreme Court: Clarifying the Scope of Abortion Rights, STAN. L. SCH.: LEGAL
AGGREGATE (Nov. 17, 2015), https://law.stanford.edu/2015/11/17/at-the-supreme-courtclarifying-the-scope-of-abortion-rights/ [https://perma.cc/3AA9-AJNS] (“Casey explicitly
weakened Roe’s constitutional protection. In a joint opinion written by Justices Kennedy,
O’Connor and Souter, Casey imposed a new, less demanding standard in lieu of the strict
scrutiny Roe had applied to the core right.”); see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 869 (“It is therefore
imperative to adhere to the essence of Roe’s original decision, and we do so today.”).
17. Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 (plurality opinion).
18. Id. at 878.
19. See id. at 901 (striking down the spousal notification requirement).
20. Id. at 884 (“To be sure, the physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak are
implicated, but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and
regulation by the State. We see no constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the
physician provide the information mandated by the State here.” (emphasis added) (internal
citations omitted)).
21. See Lauren Paulk, Article, What Is an “Undue Burden”? The Casey Standard as
Applied to Informed Consent Provisions, 20 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 71, 97 (2013) (noting
that “courts differ in their manner of addressing First Amendment challenges in the
context of abortion regulations, leaving a split in the [c]ircuits on how to address informed
consent provisions”); Lauren R. Robbins, Comment, Open Your Mouth and Say
‘Ideology’: Physicians and the First Amendment, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 173–74 (2009)
(concluding that “the attention the [Casey] Court gave to the First Amendment argument
as a whole was fairly fleeting” and explaining that “[s]peech restrictions regulated solely as
‘part of the practice of medicine’ place them in the context of a world that most people
assume is characterized by scientific facts. Even in medicine, however, there are fuzzy lines
between facts and ideas”). As one constitutional law professor said, “[i]n 1992, the Casey
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uncertainty as to whether the Court intended the undue burden test
to apply even in the face of a First Amendment challenge.22
Although the Court’s holding in Casey left some questions
unanswered, one takeaway remains undisputed: states have the power
to enact some regulations on abortion procedures within their
borders.23 This power to regulate abortion stems from the general
power of states to ensure informed consent to surgery; the Court has
held that the state has the right to ensure a patient understands the
ramifications of, and alternatives to, a surgical procedure.24 Many
states have exercised this power by passing statutes mandating that
women receive certain information prior to undergoing an abortion.25
Known as “informed consent” provisions, these rules mirror the
requirements in other medical settings designed to ensure that the
patient has full information about the risks and alternatives
accompanying a given medical procedure.26
In the years since Casey, many states have enacted demanding
informed consent requirements in the abortion context.27 The
requirements of informed consent provisions for abortions often go

plurality began its opinion this way: ‘Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.’
Nearly a quarter century later, I read those words and don’t know whether to laugh or
cry.” Garrett Epps, Will the U.S. Supreme Court Give a Clear Answer on Abortion?, THE
ATLANTIC (Nov. 15, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/supremecourt-hears-new-abortion-case/416055/ [https://perma.cc/FNU2-TBHS] (quoting Casey,
505 U.S. at 844).
22. See supra note 21.
23. Casey, 505 U.S. at 869–70 (plurality opinion).
24. Id. at 882–83 (“We also see no reason why the State may not require doctors to
inform a woman seeking an abortion of the availability of materials relating to the
consequences to the fetus, even when those consequences have no direct relation to her
health. An example illustrates the point. We would think it constitutional for the State to
require that in order for there to be informed consent to a kidney transplant operation the
recipient must be supplied with information about risks to the donor as well as risks to
himself or herself.”).
25. See, e.g., GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: REQUIREMENTS FOR
ULTRASOUND 1–2 (2016), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RFU.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z4KQ-GUD8] (noting that twenty-five states require abortion providers
to perform or offer to perform an ultrasound on women seeking abortions); Scott W.
Gaylord & Thomas J. Molony, Casey and a Woman’s Right to Know: Ultrasounds,
Informed Consent, and the First Amendment, 45 CONN. L. REV. 595, 603–05, tbls.1 & 2
(2012) (describing the increasing number of state statutes that require oral explanation
and description of ultrasound images as part of their informed consent requirements and
providing a table outlining the requirements in each state).
26. See DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 308 (2d ed. 2011) (explaining that the informed consent principle arises from the
courts’ recognition of the patient’s right to important information about the nature of the
medical procedure proposed, including risks and alternative procedures).
27. See Gaylord & Molony, supra note 25, at 603.
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well beyond the requirements of informed consent for other types of
medical procedures.28 One of the most controversial of these
requirements are “speech-and-display” provisions. Such provisions go
beyond requiring that physicians perform ultrasounds on women
seeking abortions29 by compelling the physician to display and
describe the ultrasound image to women. This is required even if a
woman expressly states that she does not want to receive the
information.30 Physicians who fail to comply face severe
repercussions, including loss of licensure.31
In 2011, North Carolina enacted its own “speech-and-display”
provision as part of the Woman’s Right to Know Act (“WRKA”).32
The provision required physicians to display ultrasound images to
women seeking abortions, and to describe “the presence, location,
and dimensions” of a fetus, specifically the “presence of external
members and internal organs, if present and viewable.”33 Under the
WRKA, the description must be presented in conjunction with
information about the availability of state assistance for childbirth
28. For example, the North Carolina statute required physicians to communicate
certain information to women seeking abortions, removing the discretion that was
available in the statutes at issue in Casey. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85(a) (2015),
with Casey, 505 U.S. at 883–84 (plurality opinion) (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205
(1990)).
29. North Carolina has required physicians to perform preabortion ultrasounds since
1994. Prior to the speech-and-display laws, however, there was no requirement that
physicians show the ultrasound to women, or discuss the image with them. See Federal Court
Strikes Ultrasound Requirement—New Prolife Rankings Show NC Most Improved, NC
VALUES
COALITION
(Jan.
2014), http://ncvalues.org/2014/01/federal-court-strikesultrasound-requirement-new-pro-life-rankings-show-nc-mostimproved/ [https://perma.cc/QB7J-7AUB] (noting that North Carolina has required a
preabortion ultrasound since 1994, but that doctors do not usually show or describe the
images to women).
30. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85(a); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 171.0124 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); Act of Apr. 27, 2010, ch. 173, 2010
Okla. Sess. Law 598, 599, invalidated by Nova Health Sys. v. Pruitt, 292 P.3d 28 (Okla.
2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 617 (2013). The language “shall” within these statutes
removes physician discretion and means that physicians are required to communicate the
information even if the woman does not want to receive it. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85(a);
see also § 90-21.85(b) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent a pregnant
woman from averting her eyes from the displayed images or from refusing to hear the
simultaneous explanation and medical description.”).
31. See Dahlia Lithwick, North Carolina’s Outrageous Abortion Requirement Is Struck
Down, SLATE (Dec. 22, 2015, 3:11 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics
/jurisprudence/2014/12/north_carolina_abortion_ultrasound_decision_quotes_from_judge_
wilkinson.html [https://perma.cc/Z8YR-ZNGR] (noting that physicians who violate the act
are liable for damages and may lose their licenses to practice medicine in North Carolina).
32. Woman’s Right to Know Act, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 2105 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 90-21.80 to -21.92).
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85(a)(2), (4).

94 N.C. L. REV. 1036 (2016)

1042

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

and childcare, and the possibility of suing for parental support.34
Finally, the physician must offer women the opportunity to hear a
fetal heart tone, and must obtain “written certification from [a]
woman, before the abortion, that the requirements of this section
have been complied with[.]”35
The constitutionality of the North Carolina speech-and-display
provision is arguable. Proponents point to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Casey, which upheld a provision of a Pennsylvania statute
that required physicians to provide certain information to women
before physicians could perform abortions.36 In Casey, the Court held
that a state may require women to receive information about fetal
development and childcare assistance, and that “[t]his requirement
cannot be considered a substantial obstacle to obtaining an abortion,
and, it follows, there is no undue burden.”37 Supporters of speechand-display laws argue that this statement from the Supreme Court
sets a clear standard for review of informed consent provisions: so
long as they do not impose an undue burden, all state efforts to
provide women with information preabortion must be upheld.38
Pro-choice activists, on the other hand, argue that Casey did not
intend to supplant traditional First Amendment analysis of speech
claims by creating the undue burden test. They distinguish the new
informed consent requirements by pointing out that the recent
speech-and-display provisions are a greater infringement on
physicians’ First Amendment rights; the new laws provide no
exception if the physician believes that receipt of the message would
harm a woman’s health, and they contain more explicitly ideological
content than the provision at issue in Casey.39 These differences,
plaintiffs argue, meant that the mere fact that the Supreme Court
upheld the informed consent provision at issue in Casey does not
34. § 90-21.82(a).
35. § 90-21.85(a)(5).
36. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881 (1992) (plurality
opinion).
37. Id. at 883.
38. See Reply Brief of Appellants at 21, Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir.
2014) (No. 14-1150), 2014 WL 3107872, at *21 (pointing to Casey as support for its
conclusion that “if there is any kind of ‘heightened scrutiny,’ [to be applied to this
provision] it should be whether the regulation places an undue burden on the patient’s
right to abortion—which it does not”).
39. See Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Reply Brief in Support of Their Motion for Summary
Judgment at 2–3, Stuart v. Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d 585 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (No. 1:11-cv00804), 2013 WL 4028992 (“As Plaintiffs have repeatedly explained, the Requirement is a
content-based regulation that compels physicians to parrot the State’s message against
their will.”).
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mean that Casey permanently separated abortion regulations from
First Amendment jurisprudence.40
In 2014, North Carolina physicians and health care providers
brought suit in federal court to resolve the debate: they challenged
the WRKA’s speech-and-display provision as a violation of their First
Amendment right to be free from compelled speech.41 The district
court agreed with the plaintiffs that the provision violated the First
Amendment rights of physicians by requiring them to deliver the
state’s ideological message.42 Following North Carolina’s appeal, the
Fourth Circuit heard the case and affirmed the district court’s
decision.43 Notably, instead of reading Casey as requiring informed
consent provisions to be reviewed under the undue burden standard,
the Fourth Circuit found that the district court correctly applied a
First Amendment analysis to the speech-and-display provision.44 In so
holding, the Fourth Circuit deviated from two sister circuits: both the
Fifth and Eighth Circuits had previously interpreted Casey as
requiring an undue burden standard for review of state abortion
regulations and upheld speech-and-display provisions on those
grounds.45 The Fourth Circuit decision in Stuart v. Camnitz thus
created a circuit split over what standard the courts should apply to
speech-and-display provisions in the abortion context.
II. A CIRCUIT SPLIT: CONTRASTING APPROACHES TO CASEY
PRECEDENT
The crux of the circuit courts’ disagreement is whether Casey’s
undue burden test is the exclusive standard under which state
regulations of abortion should be assessed. The Fifth Circuit found
that Casey dictated review of informed consent requirements under
the undue burden test and upheld Texas’s speech-and-display

40. See id. at 2 (“As this Court has already held, Casey’s First Amendment discussion
does not control the outcome here—and traditional strict scrutiny applies—because unlike
the Pennsylvania law upheld in Casey, the Display of Real-Time View Requirement (the
“Requirement”) is not a reasonable regulation of medical practice.”).
41. See Stuart v. Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d 585, 588 (M.D.N.C. 2014), aff’d sub nom.
Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2838 (2015).
42. See id.
43. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 256 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2838
(2015).
44. Id. at 245.
45. See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 576
(5th Cir. 2012); Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 653 F.3d 662, 669 (8th Cir.), vacated
in part, 662 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2011).
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provision under that standard.46 The Fourth Circuit, in contrast, found
that Casey did not preclude First Amendment analysis.47 Rather,
restrictions on physician speech in this context should be assessed
under intermediate scrutiny—a standard the North Carolina speechand-display provision did not survive.48 To fully understand this
circuit split, it is necessary to briefly examine the Supreme Court’s
analysis of the informed consent provision in Casey.
A. The Murky Precedent of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey
In Casey, nearly twenty years after its seminal decision in Roe,
the Supreme Court considered the validity of several provisions of a
Pennsylvania statute that imposed a variety of restrictions on access
to abortion. The restrictions included a twenty-four hour waiting
period, parental consent requirements for minors, spousal notification
requirements, reporting standards for abortion providers, and
informed consent provisions.49 Although the Casey Court nominally
affirmed the right to an abortion first recognized in Roe v. Wade,50 it
introduced a new test for assessing state regulations on access to
abortion: the undue burden test.51 The Court held that “[a]n undue
burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose
46. See Lakey, 667 F.3d at 576 (“First, informed consent laws that do not impose an
undue burden on the woman’s right to have an abortion are permissible if they require
truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant disclosures. Second, such laws are part of the state’s
reasonable regulation of medical practice and do not fall under the rubric of compelling
‘ideological’ speech that triggers First Amendment strict scrutiny.”).
47. See Camnitz, 774 F.3d at 249 (“With respect, our sister circuits read too much
into Casey and Gonzales. The single paragraph in Casey does not assert that physicians
forfeit their First Amendment rights in the procedures surrounding abortions, nor does it
announce the proper level of scrutiny to be applied to abortion regulations that compel
speech to the extraordinary extent present here.”).
48. See id. (“A heightened intermediate level of scrutiny is thus consistent with
Supreme Court precedent and appropriately recognizes the intersection here of regulation
of speech and regulation of the medical profession in the context of an abortion
procedure.”).
49. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) (listing the
five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982 being reviewed by the
Court).
50. See id. at 869 (plurality opinion) (“It is therefore imperative to adhere to the
essence of Roe’s original decision, and we do so today.”); id. at 871 (“The woman’s right to
terminate her pregnancy before viability is the most central principle of Roe v. Wade. It is
a rule of law and a component of liberty we cannot renounce.”). But see id. at 873
(rejecting Roe’s trimester framework as “rigid” and flawed for its undervaluation of the
state’s interest in potential life).
51. See id. at 874 (“Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a
woman’s ability to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of
the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”).
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or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.”52 Therefore,
under the new test, so long as a state regulation did not create a
“substantial obstacle” to women receiving abortions, the regulation
would not be deemed to impose an “undue burden” and would be
upheld.53
The current circuit split arises from uncertainty about whether
the Supreme Court applied the undue burden test to all of the
provisions under consideration in Casey. It is clear that the Supreme
Court applied the undue burden test to the twenty-four hour waiting
period, reporting requirements, and spousal notification provision.54
The Court explicitly held that the waiting period did not amount to an
undue burden,55 and used the language of the undue burden test when
it held that the reporting requirements did not impose a “substantial
obstacle.”56 Similarly, the Court found that a spousal notification
requirement would impose a “substantial obstacle” to women seeking
abortions.57
But the language of the holding leaves room to question whether
the Court also applied the undue burden standard to the statute’s
informed consent requirements. Confusion arises from the language
with which the plurality upheld the informed consent provision in
Casey. First, in the paragraph referencing the physicians’ First
Amendment challenge, the Court did not use the language of the
undue burden test, referencing neither “undue burden” nor
“substantial obstacle.”58 Second, the Court limited its holding
language in rejecting the physicians’ First Amendment challenge to
the Pennsylvania provision.59
In noting that the physicians’ First Amendment rights were
implicated, but were not sufficiently infringed to overcome the

52. Id. at 878.
53. Id. at 877 (“A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a
state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”).
54. Id. at 878.
55. Id. at 885.
56. Id. at 883.
57. Id. at 893–94 (O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ., opinion of the Court). The
Court upheld the parental consent provision on alternate grounds, pointing to case law
supporting a state’s right to require a minor seeking an abortion to obtain the consent of a
parent or physician. Id. at 899 (plurality opinion).
58. Id. at 884.
59. Id.
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Pennsylvania informed consent provision,60 the Court held that “[w]e
see no constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the physician
provide the information mandated by the State here.”61 Further, the
plurality stated, “if the information the State requires to be made
available to the woman is truthful and not misleading, the
requirement may be permissible.”62 Use of the word “may” as
opposed to “will” or “must” or “is always” suggests both that the
“truthful and non-misleading” factor may not have been intended as a
magic token by which all compliant statutes would be made
constitutional and that other factors may be considered in assessing
constitutionality. By using precise language and words of limitation,
the Court may have indicated an unwillingness to create a sweeping
rule to apply in all future informed consent cases.63
The linguistic muddle continued with the Court’s discussion of
the extent of state power over abortion regulation, which can be read
to narrow the scope of its holding on this issue. Casey indisputably
established that the state has an interest in protecting fetal life64 and
can promote that interest: “[A] State is permitted to enact persuasive
measures which favor childbirth over abortion, even if those measures
do not further a health interest.”65 But on the question of informed
consent, the Court held that “requiring that [a] woman be informed
of the availability of information relating to fetal development . . . is a
reasonable measure to ensure an informed choice[.]”66 The difference
60. Id. (“[T]he physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated, but
only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by
the State.” (citation omitted)).
61. Id. (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 882 (emphasis added).
63. See Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 249 (4th Cir. 2014) (“But the plurality did not
hold sweepingly that all regulation of speech in the medical context merely receives
rational basis review. Rather, having noted the physicians’ First Amendment rights and
the state’s countervailing interest in regulating the medical profession, the plurality simply
stated that it saw ‘no constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide
the information mandated by the State here.’ That particularized finding hardly announces
a guiding standard of scrutiny for use in every subsequent compelled speech case involving
abortion.” (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992)
(plurality opinion))), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2838 (2015).
64. The validity of a state’s interest in promoting fetal life was reiterated in Gonzales
v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). In Carhart, the Court described the premise that “the
government has a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal
life” as “central” to Casey. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 145. Although Carhart serves as an
example of the Court’s continued application of the undue burden standard to abortion
restrictions in the decades following Casey, that case did not include a First Amendment
challenge and therefore will not be discussed further in this Recent Development.
65. Casey, 505 U.S. at 886 (plurality opinion).
66. Id. at 883 (emphasis added).
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between informing a woman that information is available and
mandating that she receive the information even against her express
wishes is clear. Less clear is whether the Supreme Court would
consider the distinction important.
The determination of whether the undue burden test or a First
Amendment analysis applies to a given provision has a critical impact
on any challenge’s chance of success. Under the undue burden test,
the state must merely show that a law does not in purpose or effect
create a substantial obstacle to women’s access to abortion. Under a
First Amendment approach, a state law must survive heightened
scrutiny (either intermediate or strict scrutiny).67 To defend a law
reviewed under intermediate scrutiny, the government carries a
greater burden: it must show that the law directly advances a
substantial government interest, and that the law is narrowly tailored
to serve that government interest.68
Pro-choice activists claim there is doubt as to whether the Casey
Court relied on the undue burden standard. They point to the free
speech implications of the speech-and-display provisions, and argue
that independent of whether the provisions are an undue burden on
women seeking abortions, the question remains whether the
requirements infringe the free speech rights of physicians.69 Scholars
argue that the Casey Court could not have intended all First
Amendment jurisprudence to be supplanted by the undue burden
standard simply because the First Amendment challenge arises in the
abortion context.70 Proponents of speech-and-display laws, on the
other hand, claim that the attempt to bring a First Amendment
component back into the state abortion regulation debate is a
“deliberate and strategically motivated attempt to boost the level of
scrutiny given the law at issue here and to blur the focus of that

67. See generally 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1041, Westlaw (database updated
Dec. 2015) (explaining the levels of scrutiny applied under various First Amendment
analyses).
68. Stuart v. Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d 585, 593 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (citing Cent. Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980)), aff’d sub nom.
Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2838 (2015).
69. See Borgmann, supra note 12.
70. See id; see also Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment
Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 989 (arguing that
Casey’s undue burden standard “is concerned with protecting a woman’s ‘personal
liberty[,]’ ” but that “[t]he First Amendment, by contrast, is not primarily concerned to
protect the autonomy of those trying to decide whether to seek an abortion, but instead to
preserve the integrity of physician-patient communications as a channel for the
dissemination of expert knowledge”).
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scrutiny.”71 This uncertainty about the standard set in Casey thus set
the stage for a circuit split.
B.

The Fifth Circuit’s Interpretation of Casey

In 2012, the Fifth Circuit upheld a Texas speech-and-display law
as a valid exercise of the state’s right to regulate abortion.72 In Texas
Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services v. Lakey,73 the court
reviewed a statute that was in many respects similar to North
Carolina’s WRKA: physicians were required to display ultrasound
images to women seeking abortions and to describe the “dimensions
of the embryo or fetus, the presence of cardiac activity, and the
presence of external members and internal organs[.]”74 The Fifth
Circuit concluded that speech-and-display provisions were part of the
state’s reasonable regulation of medical practice and did not trigger
First Amendment scrutiny,75 finding that “[t]he mode of compelled
expression is not by itself constitutionally relevant, although the
context is.”76 Thus, the Fifth Circuit found that because there was no
First Amendment analysis in the Supreme Court’s assessment of the
informed consent provision in Casey, the provision was a permissible
state regulation so long as it satisfied the undue burden standard.
To support this interpretation, the Fifth Circuit highlighted the
noticeable absence of any familiar phrases indicating a First
Amendment analysis in Casey and even called Casey’s analysis of the
physicians’ First Amendment claims “the antithesis of strict
scrutiny.”77 Although the Casey plurality discussed the importance of
the state’s interest in promoting fetal life, it did not analyze whether
Pennsylvania had a “compelling interest,” nor did it discuss whether
the informed consent provision was “narrowly tailored” to the state’s
interest.78 In fact, the Court cursorily declared that the informed
consent requirement fell within the state’s power to regulate the
practice of medicine and thus posed no “constitutional infirmity.”79

71. See Reply Brief of Appellants, supra note 38, at 16.
72. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 572 (5th
Cir. 2012).
73. 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012).
74. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (West, Westlaw through 2015
Reg. Sess.).
75. Lakey, 667 F.3d at 576.
76. Id. at 580.
77. Id. at 575.
78. See Gaylord & Molony, supra note 25, at 619.
79. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (plurality
opinion).
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When considering the argument that the statute went too far because
it required physicians, and not qualified assistants, to deliver the
relevant information to women, the Court stated that “[t]here is no
evidence on this record that requiring a doctor to give the information
as provided by the statute would amount in practical terms to a
substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion, [and so] we
conclude that it is not an undue burden.”80 This language suggests
that the Court did apply an undue burden analysis to the informed
consent provisions and that the Court upheld the Pennsylvania
informed consent requirements on those grounds.
The Fifth Circuit thus applied an undue burden analysis and held
that “informed consent laws that do not impose an undue burden on
the woman’s right to have an abortion are permissible if they require
truthful, non-misleading, and relevant disclosures.”81 The Lakey court
considered “the required disclosures of a sonogram, the fetal
heartbeat, and their medical descriptions [to be] the epitome of
truthful, non-misleading information[,]”82 and rejected the contention
that the message compelled by the state was ideological. Focusing
only on the literal words required by the speech-and-display
provisions, the court stated: “a photograph and description of [the
fetus’s] features constitute the purest conceivable expression of
‘factual information.’ ”83
The Fifth Circuit was equally unconvinced by the argument that
compelling the physician to orally deliver the state’s message creates
the impression that the physician endorsed the message. The court
stated that “[the] statute’s method of delivering this information is
direct and powerful, but the mode of delivery does not make a
constitutionally significant difference from the [provisions at issue in
Casey] which required physicians to make certain information
available to women.”84 The court elaborated: “The mode of
compelled expression is not by itself constitutionally relevant,
although the context is. Here, the context is the regulation of
informed consent to a medical procedure.”85 The court rejected the
notion that the facts of Casey “represent a constitutional ceiling for
regulation of informed consent to abortion”86—just because the Texas

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 884–85.
Lakey, 667 F.3d at 576.
Id. at 577–78.
Id. at 577 n.4.
Id. at 579.
Id. at 580.
Id. at 579.
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provisions were more demanding than the regulations at issue in
Casey did not mean they could not stand. Ultimately, the court
concluded in Lakey that Casey required application of the undue
burden standard for compelled physician speech in the context of
abortion regulations and held that the Texas speech-and-display
provision was permissible under that standard.87 In contrast, the
Fourth Circuit interpreted Casey more narrowly.
C.

The Fourth Circuit’s Holding in Stuart v. Camnitz

Unlike the Fifth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit was less confident
that Casey intended to “hold sweepingly that all regulation of speech
in the medical context” receives a lower level of review.88 The Fourth
Circuit focused on the lack of any clear declaration by the Casey
Court that the undue burden standard should displace First
Amendment analysis for speech challenges in the abortion context
and rejected the notion that Casey instituted a regime of abortion
exceptionalism.89 The court emphasized the narrow language of
Casey’s informed consent discussion, and asserted that “our sister
circuits read too much into Casey.”90 As a result, the Fourth Circuit
upheld the district court’s conclusion that it was “unlikely that the
Supreme Court decided by implication that long-established First
Amendment law was irrelevant when speech about abortion is at
issue.”91
After concluding that Casey did not mandate application of the
undue burden standard as the test for all challenges to informed
consent provisions, the Fourth Circuit turned to the question of where
on the free speech spectrum the physician speech mandated by the
North Carolina provision fell. The extent to which a state can lawfully
regulate professional speech depends on how that speech is
categorized.92 Here, the Fourth Circuit determined that the speech87. Id.
88. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 249 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2838
(2015).
89. See id.
90. Id.
91. Gaylord & Molony, supra note 25, at 615 (quoting Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d
424, 430 (M.D.N.C. 2011)).
92. Supreme Court precedent establishes that states may regulate professions as part
of the exercise of their police power. See, e.g., Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 191
(1898) (upholding the state’s right to regulate the practice of medicine). At least some
circuits agree that the extent to which government can regulate such professional speech
varies “ ‘along a continuum’ from ‘public dialogue’ on one end to ‘regulation of
professional conduct[.]’ ”). Camnitz, 774 F.3d at 248 (quoting Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d
1208, 1227, 1229 (9th Cir. 2013). When speaking outside of the doctor-patient relationship,
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and-display provisions fell in the middle of the professional regulation
spectrum.93 On this spectrum, state power is at its height in regulation
of professional conduct, even if the regulation has an incidental
impact on speech.94 State power to regulate speech is weakest when
the regulation impacts public dialogue; as a result, state regulation of
public speech is reviewed under a strict scrutiny standard.95 The court
noted that although the state does have broad power to regulate
professions, the fact that medicine is a self-regulating profession limits
the control the state can exert over medical practice.96 The court also
considered that the speech-and-display requirement both compelled
speech (a factor supporting a higher level of scrutiny) and was part of
a valid state regulation of the medical profession (a factor supporting
a lower level of scrutiny).97 In light of these competing factors, the
court concluded that intermediate scrutiny provided the appropriate
balance.98 To defend a law reviewed under intermediate scrutiny, “the
government must prove that the restriction directly advances and is
narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest.”99
Turning to the merits of the physicians’ First Amendment
challenge, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the speech-and-display

physicians are constitutionally equivalent to “soapbox orators[,]” and their speech is fully
protected; a strict scrutiny standard of review applies to any state restrictions on such
speech. See Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1227–28 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that at the
far end of the spectrum, speech is entitled to “robust” First Amendment protection and
that “communicating to the public on matters of public concern lies at the core of First
Amendment values”). In the middle of the continuum, there is a lesser, although not
completely diminished, level of First Amendment protection. See id. at 1228. Finally, at
the other end of the continuum, the state’s power is at its greatest when regulation
concerns professional conduct. Id. at 1229. Here, speech is considered to be “incidental” to
the regulated behavior, and it may not be protected by the First Amendment at all. Id.
93. Camnitz, 774 F.3d at 248. Some have argued that the lack of explicit guidance in
Casey should have dictated the Fourth Circuit’s opinion and that Camnitz was an
unfortunate example of judicial activism. See Michael Ramsey, Judge Wilkinson and
Judicial Restraint Revisited, ORIGINALISM BLOG (Dec. 29, 2014), http://originalismblog
.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2014/12/judge-wilkinson-and-judicial-restraintrevisitedmichael-ramsey.html [https://perma.cc/NA3E-M29B] (“If judicial restraint means
strong judicial deference to legislative judgments . . . one would think it indicates the
opposite result in Stuart—there’s no obvious Supreme Court case on point, the
Constitution’s text has nothing specific to say on the matter, and other courts have upheld
similar statutes.”).
94. See Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1229.
95. See id. at 1227–28.
96. Camnitz, 774 F.3d at 248.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Stuart v. Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d 585, 593 (M.D.N.C. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Stuart
v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2838 (2015).
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provisions of the WRKA failed to withstand intermediate scrutiny.100
It noted that compelled speech is “particularly suspect” because
“[l]isteners may have difficulty discerning that the message is the
state’s, not the speaker’s . . . .”101 The North Carolina statute created
this exact risk; it required physicians to present all of the information
to women in physicians’ own voices,102 thus creating the possibility
that a woman might understand the state’s message as the physician’s
message. The Fourth Circuit found this fact particularly convincing in
this instance because the court considered the state’s message to be
“explicitly . . . pro-life” in its “provision of facts that all fall on one
side of the abortion debate . . . .”103
In contrast, although the informed consent provision in Casey
required physicians to orally inform women of the nature, risks, and
alternatives to the procedures, as well as the probable gestational age
of the fetus and the medical risks associated with carrying a child to
term,104 there were less stringent requirements for information not
directly tied to women’s health. The provision required that a woman
seeking an abortion be told that printed materials containing
information about state benefits and the potential liability of the
father were available to her if she wished to view them.105
Significantly, the information came in the form of printed materials,
which did not necessarily have to be delivered by the physician so
long as the woman received them.106 The Fourth Circuit marked the
importance of this distinction by noting, “[t]he information conveyed
here in the examining room [under the North Carolina statute] more
closely resembles the materials that in Casey were provided by the
state in a pamphlet.”107
The Fourth Circuit also considered the absence of a therapeutic
exception as a sign that the provisions interfered with the medical
judgment of abortion providers: “Furthermore, by failing to include a
therapeutic privilege exception, the Display of Real-Time View
Requirement interferes with the physician’s professional judgment

100. Camnitz, 774 F.3d at 250.
101. Id. at 246.
102. Id. at 245.
103. Id. at 246.
104. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205(a)(i)–(iii) (1990).
105. Id.
106. Id.; see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881 (1992)
(plurality opinion).
107. Camnitz, 774 F.3d at 253.
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and ethical obligations.”108 The North Carolina informed consent
provision requires the physician to transmit the state’s message even if
a woman states that she does not want to receive the information.109
In such a scenario, the law provides that “[n]othing in this section
shall be construed to prevent a pregnant woman from averting her
eyes from the displayed images or from refusing to hear the
simultaneous explanation and medical description.”110 While the
North Carolina statute does include an exception in the case of a
medical emergency,111 there is no “therapeutic exception” through
which a physician can determine by the exercise of his or her medical
judgment that the patient’s health would be better served by not
providing the information.112 This is unlike the provision at issue in
Casey, where the Supreme Court noted that
the statute now before us does not require a physician to
comply with the informed consent provisions “if he or she can
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she
reasonably believed that furnishing the information would have
resulted in a severely adverse effect on the physical or mental
health of the patient.”113
One final factor convinced the Fourth Circuit that the
requirements of the North Carolina speech-and-display provisions
were too extreme to satisfy intermediate scrutiny. The provision
required not only that the physician communicate information to a
woman when she was in a position of vulnerability (“half-naked or
disrobed on her back on an examination table, with an ultrasound
probe either on her belly or inserted into her vagina”),114 but also that
108. Id. at 254 (“Requiring the physician to provide the information regardless of the
psychological or emotional wellbeing of the patient can hardly be considered closely
drawn to those state interests the provision is supposed to promote.” (citation omitted)).
109. Id. at 252 (“The challenged Display of Real-Time View Requirement, however,
reaches beyond the modified form of informed consent that the Court approved in
Casey . . . . [I]t imposes a virtually unprecedented burden on the right of professional
speech that operates to the detriment of both speaker and listener . . . . The most serious
deviation from standard practice is requiring the physician to display an image and
provide an explanation and medical description to a woman who has through ear and eye
covering rendered herself temporarily deaf and blind.” (citation omitted)).
110. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85(b) (2015).
111. § 90-21.85(a).
112. See Stuart v. Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d 585, 603–04 (M.D.N.C. 2014), aff’d sub nom.
Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2838 (2015).
113. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883–84 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205(c) (1990)).
114. Camnitz, 774 F.3d at 255 (“[I]nformed consent has not generally been thought to
require a patient to view images from his or her own body . . . much less in a setting in
which personal judgment may be altered or impaired.” (citation omitted)).
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the physician display the image and provide an explanation “to a
woman who has through ear and eye covering rendered herself
temporarily deaf and blind.”115 That the statute required the
information to be delivered even if the woman did not receive it
indicated to the court that the state’s intent was not the achievement
of informed consent but rather communication of an ideological
message.116 In contrast, the provisions under consideration in Casey
merely required that “[t]he physician or a qualified
nonphysician . . . inform the woman of the availability of printed
materials . . . .”117 There was no requirement that the information be
delivered to a woman while her ultrasound was in progress.
Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit found the setting in which the
message must be delivered, the absence of a therapeutic exception,
and the clear ideological intent of the statute to constitute
impermissible interference with physicians’ professional judgment
and to “impos[e] a virtually unprecedented burden on the right of
professional speech that operates to the detriment of both speaker
and listener.”118 The state’s interest in advancing its ideological
message was insufficient to outweigh the burden on physicians’ rights
to be free from the compelled speech imposed by the informed
consent provision; thus, the provision could not withstand
intermediate scrutiny.119 Rejecting the undue burden standard as the
exclusive test for analysis of abortion regulations and applying a First
Amendment standard of intermediate scrutiny to the provision, the
Fourth Circuit struck down the WRKA’s speech-and-display
requirement.120 Although this decision was a departure from the
approach of other circuit courts, it was the correct result in terms of
following Casey and of broader legal policy.
III. WHY THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S APPROACH IS THE SUPERIOR
INTERPRETATION
The Fourth Circuit’s reading of Casey’s stance on informed
consent provisions is the better interpretation of Supreme Court
precedent. Three main reasons support the superiority of the Fourth
115. Id. at 252.
116. Id. (“This is starkly compelled speech that impedes on the physician’s First
Amendment rights with no counterbalancing promotion of state interests. The woman
does not receive the information, so it cannot inform her decision.”); see also N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 90-21.85(b).
117. Casey, 505 U.S. at 881 (plurality opinion).
118. Camnitz, 774 F.3d at 252.
119. Id. at 255.
120. Id. at 255–56.
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Circuit’s narrow approach over the more expansive construction
suggested by the Fifth Circuit. First, the lack of therapeutic
exceptions in recent speech-and-display provisions puts women’s
health at risk and impermissibly interferes with the patient-physician
relationship in a manner not contemplated by Casey. Second, the
inclusion of an allowance for women to cover their eyes and ears
reveals the lack of connection between the compelled speech and the
state’s alleged goal of ensuring women’s informed consent, removing
it from the class of restrictions permitted in Casey. Third, the Fourth
Circuit’s rejection of abortion exceptionalism ensures the continued
integrity of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. Each reason will be
addressed in turn.
A. The Speech-and-Display Provision Eliminates Physician
Discretion and Interferes with the Patient-Physician Relationship
The lack of a therapeutic exception in the North Carolina
speech-and-display provision distinguishes it from the Pennsylvania
provision upheld in Casey. In its evaluation of the provision, the
Casey Court indicated that the impact of the informed consent
requirements on the mental health of women should be a
consideration in assessing the requirements’ validity.121 The Court
noted that the Pennsylvania requirement contained an exception if
the physician believed that furnishing the information would cause a
“severely adverse effect on the physical or mental health of the
patient.”122 By emphasizing that “the statute does not prevent the
physician from exercising his or her medical judgment[,]”123 the Court
suggested that the existence of a therapeutic exception was at least a
factor in its decision to uphold Pennsylvania’s informed consent
requirements.
The North Carolina provision, however, removes the ability of
the physician to alter the message based on his or her professional
assessment of what is best for the patient’s health. Supporters of this
provision explain the denial of physician discretion by claiming that
women who do not receive full information prior to having an
abortion may suffer psychological harm due to regret.124 But such
121. Casey, 505 U.S. at 883 (plurality opinion).
122. Id. (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205(c) (1990)).
123. Id. at 883–84.
124. See Steven Ertelt, North Carolina Holds Hearing on Pro-Life Abortion Info Bill,
LIFENEWS (May 6, 2011), http://www.lifenews.com/2011/05/06/north-carolina-holdshearing-on-pro-life-abortion-info-bill/ [http://perma.cc/R5ZV-4Q8A] (telling the story of a
woman who reported that she received an abortion without being given full information
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arguments miss a key distinction: those opposed to the provision do
not question the importance of providing women seeking abortions
with full information, nor do they challenge the state’s right to ensure
such information is communicated. They only note that there are
certain situations, such as when a woman is ending a pregnancy due to
medical complications with the fetus, when a mandatory display and
description of the fetus’s dimensions could put the woman’s mental
health at risk.125 Indeed, the Supreme Court acknowledged in Casey
the importance of women’s mental health: “It cannot be questioned
that psychological well-being is a facet of health.”126 This risk to
women’s health created by the mandatory nature of the North
Carolina speech-and-display provision is exacerbated by the fact that
it requires the state’s message to be delivered to a woman during an
ultrasound while she is in a state of undress and vulnerability.127
Not only does the statute create the possibility that physicians in
some instances will be required to make statements that could harm
their patients’ mental health, the very compulsion of speech
compromises the physician-patient relationship. The U.S. District
Court for the Middle District of North Carolina noted that the
mandatory transmission of information required by the WRKA
forced physicians to deviate from their normal practice of respecting a
patient’s choice not to receive information.128 The court pointed to the
position of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
which “advised physicians that a patient’s refusal of information is
‘itself an exercise of choice, and its acceptance can be part of respect
for the patient’s autonomy’ and ‘[i]mplicit in the ethical concept of
informed consent is the goal of maximizing a patient’s freedoms.’ ”129

prior to the procedure and quoting her as saying, “[t]he only words that [the doctor] said
to me—while he was doing the procedure—was: ‘You’re further along than we thought.’
Those words haunt me to this day”).
125. One Texas woman found herself in this exact position. After doctors informed
Carolyn Jones that her fetus had a “molecular flaw” incompatible with proper brain
development, she was forced to observe an ultrasound visual and hear a description
including the phrase, “Here I see a well-developed diaphragm and here I see four healthy
chambers of the heart . . . .” Carolyn Jones, ‘We Have No Choice’: One Woman’s Ordeal with
Texas’ New Sonogram Law, TEX. OBSERVER (Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.texasobserver.org
/we-have-no-choice-one-womans-ordeal-with-texas-new-sonogram-law/
[https://perma.cc
/49PU-SW3B].
126. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882 (plurality opinion).
127. See Stuart v. Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d 585, 609 (M.D.N.C. 2014), aff’d sub nom.
Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2838 (2015).
128. Id. at 591.
129. Id. (citing COMM. ON ETHICS, AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS,
ACOG COMMITTEE OPINION NO. 439, INFORMED CONSENT 7 (2009), https://www.acog
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Worse, the statute’s rigiditywhich requires the physician to deliver
the information even if a woman expressly states that she does not
want to hear itcould put physicians in the position of inflicting harm
on their patients:
[F]ar from promoting the psychological health of women, this
requirement risks the infliction of psychological harm on the
woman who chooses not to receive this information. She must
endure the embarrassing spectacle of averting her eyes and
covering her ears while her physician—a person to whom she
should be encouraged to listen—recites information to her.130
Thus, by eliminating physician discretion, the WRKA created a risk
of real psychological harm for women131 and violated the sanctity of
the physician-patient relationship.
Proponents of speech-and-display laws reply that because the
Casey Court upheld Pennsylvania’s twenty-four hour waiting period132
even after expressly concluding that the waiting period “limited a
physician’s discretion,” the mere limitation of physician discretion is
insufficient to strike down an otherwise valid state abortion
regulation.133 Further, they argue that any focus on the experience of
women (both as it relates to mental health and to the patientphysician relationship) is irrelevant to the physician’s First
Amendment argument.134
There is, however, a distinction between the limitation and
outright elimination of physician discretion. Where the Pennsylvania
statute limited a physician’s discretion by mandating a twenty-four
hour waiting period,135 the North Carolina statute removes a
physician’s discretion by requiring the physician to deliver
information to all women even if the physician believes the
information could harm an individual woman’s mental or physical
health.136 Further, a focus on the listener is relevant in this particular
.org/-/media/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-Ethics/co439.pdf?dmc=1&ts
=20160208T0354217522 [https://perma.cc/E6B8-2Q9Q]).
130. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 253 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2838
(2015).
131. Id. at 250.
132. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 885 (1992) (plurality
opinion).
133. Id. at 886 (“[W]hile the waiting period does limit a physician’s discretion, that is
not, standing alone, a reason to invalidate it.”).
134. See Reply Brief of Appellants, supra note 38, at 10 (critiquing the extent to which
plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim is based on allegations of potential harm to patients).
135. Casey, 505 U.S. at 886 (plurality opinion).
136. Camnitz, 774 F.3d at 253.
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context because the state’s right to compel the physician to deliver
any message at all is rooted in its power to regulate the medical
profession.137 Thus, any state law that goes beyond regulation of
medical practice and interferes with professional practice goes too far.
As one scholar explained, if a state required a physician to praise
George W. Bush during medical examinations, the state could argue
that it was regulating speech in the course of the physician’s
professional practice.138 But such a regulation could not be
constitutionally considered a regulation of professional speech
because the content of the message “is not understood as included
within the practice of medicine.”139 Such a regulation would therefore
interfere with the physician’s professional practice. Similarly, state
regulation of information presented during discussions surrounding
abortion procedures is only appropriate if it does not interfere with
the physician’s ability to provide professional medical services.140 To
ensure that state-mandated speech does not interfere with their
practice, physicians must retain the discretion to determine when it
would be detrimental to a woman’s health to receive certain
information and to withhold information in those circumstances.141
Accordingly, the lack of a therapeutic exception in the WRKA’s
informed consent provision distinguishes it from the Pennsylvania
provision upheld in Casey.142 Similarly, the ideological nature of
North Carolina’s required message sets it apart from Casey.
B.

The Speech-and-Display Provisions Are Not Aimed at Informed
Consent and Seek Only to Communicate an Ideological Message

Beyond interfering in the doctor-patient relationship, the
WRKA’s speech-and-display provision attempt to push a statesponsored ideological message on women seeking abortions—thus,
the North Carolina law is distinguishable from the informed consent
137. See Stuart v. Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d 585, 594–95, 597 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (stating
that the Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged the state’s “interest in protecting
the integrity and ethics of the medical profession” and declaring that the “state’s
regulation of professional speech must be consistent with the goals and duties of the
profession” (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997))), aff’d sub nom.
Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2838 (2015).
138. Post, supra note 70, at 952.
139. Id.
140. See Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 597 (observing that the Supreme Court has
expressed concern over statutes that interfere with professional relationships).
141. See Camnitz, 774 F.3d at 254 (noting that the North Carolina statute’s lack of a
“therapeutic privilege exception” means that physicians could be required to deliver
information that is detrimental to their patients’ health).
142. Id.

94 N.C. L. REV. 1036 (2016)

2016]

COMPELLED SPEECH

1059

requirements upheld in Casey. In the Pennsylvania case, the
information provided by the state, while decidedly pro-life, was at
least aimed at ensuring that women were fully informed before
receiving abortion procedures. The North Carolina statute, however,
explicitly provides that physicians must verbalize the state’s message
even when a woman has taken steps to avoid receiving the
information.143 As one scholar noted, “this tacit permission to not
hear the information that the physician provides is fundamentally at
odds with the process of informed consent, which requires two
engaged parties.”144 Indeed, North Carolina even acknowledged that
the purpose of the speech-and-display provision was not to provide a
woman with full information for her medical benefit but rather to
influence her to change her mind about the abortion procedure.145
Supporters of the WRKA’s stringent informed consent
requirements note the Court’s assertion in Casey that “[w]hat is at
stake is the woman’s right to make the ultimate decision, not a right
to be insulated from all others in doing so.”146 They point to Casey’s
clear holding that the state may communicate a pro-life stance to
women seeking abortions, even if the state’s information is not
related to women’s health.147 Specifically, the Court held that “under
the undue burden standard, a State is permitted to enact persuasive
measures which favor childbirth over abortion, even if those measures
do not further a health interest.”148 Read in context, this passage
suggests that a state message can make a woman aware of measures
that favor life over abortion, but that the state should not encroach on
a woman’s right to make a “thoughtful” choice on her own.149
143. Id. at 253.
144. Ryan Bakelaar, The North Carolina Woman’s Right to Know Act: An
Unconstitutional Infringement on a Physician’s First Amendment Right to Free Speech, 20
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 187, 214 (2013).
145. As the Fourth Circuit noted, “[t]he state freely admits that the purpose and
anticipated effect of the [speech-and-display provision was] to convince women seeking
abortions to change their minds or reassess their decisions.” Camnitz, 774 F.3d at 246.
146. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (plurality
opinion).
147. Id. at 886.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 872 (“Though the woman has a right to choose to terminate or continue her
pregnancy before viability, it does not at all follow that the State is prohibited from taking
steps to ensure that this choice is thoughtful and informed. Even in the earliest stages of
pregnancy, the State may enact rules and regulations designed to encourage her to know
that there are philosophic and social arguments of great weight that can be brought to
bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy to full term and that there are procedures and
institutions to allow adoption of unwanted children as well as a certain degree of state
assistance if the mother chooses to raise the child herself.”). The plurality was less clear
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Although the Court does not clearly draw a line between an
informative and an ideological message, the North Carolina statute
clearly crosses that line by specifically stating that the physician must
articulate the state’s message even when a woman is not actually
informed by the message.
The ideological bent of the state’s message is further shown by
the statute’s use of what can be described as “loaded” language.150
The statute refers not to a “fetus” or an “embryo,” but to a “child,”
despite the fact that “child” is not the medically appropriate term for
a fetus too young to survive outside the womb.151 While one might
argue that this is mere semantics, it is fair to say that much of the
political debate surrounding abortion access is fought over
semantics—that “the morality of abortion [turns on] whether a fetus
is a person . . . .”152 Because of the critical nature of the language
involved, requiring physicians to use language such as “child” is
meaningful. Describing the use of similar language in a South Dakota
speech-and-display provision, one scholar argued, “[the language]
deliberately and provocatively incorporates the language of
ideological controversy and forces physicians to affirm the side of
those who oppose abortion.”153 This is particularly inappropriate
because the patients are “blind to the source of the information they
receive. When a doctor asks the patient if she wants to view the fetus
or hear the heartbeat, . . . [the patient] may begin to feel that the

than it could have been, and uncertainty remains as to how the Court would identify a
state message that went too far. This fact was noted by the dissenters, who concluded that
“despite flowery rhetoric about the State’s ‘substantial’ and ‘profound’ interest in
‘potential human life,’ and criticism of Roe for undervaluing that interest, the joint opinion
permits the State to pursue that interest only so long as it is not too successful.” Id. at 992
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
150. Meredith Clark, Perdue Vetoes Changes to Abortion Law, REESE NEWS LAB
(June 27, 2011), http://reesenews.org/2011/06/27/changes-coming-to-n-c-abortion-laws
/16611/ [https://perma.cc/VXX3-KZX6] (including an explanation from physician David
Grimes that “[a] baby is not what’s in the uterus. A fetus is not capable of surviving
outside of the uterus, and to use this kind of language is an intentional misuse for
emotional purpose”).
151. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85(a) (2015); see Clark, supra note 150.
152. Post, supra note 70, at 955 (noting that “[t]he abortion controversy presently turns
on a debate whether the fetus enjoys the moral status of ‘a human person who is not yet a
baby but still a fully human person,’ or instead ‘there is a vast moral gulf between a fetus
and a child’ ”).
153. Id. at 956. Indeed, even Casey, the very decision proponents rely on to support the
constitutionality of the provision, used the terminology “fetus” as opposed to “unborn
child.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 881 (plurality opinion) (describing the informed consent
requirement and explaining that the physician was required to provide materials
describing “the fetus”).
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doctor wants her to continue the pregnancy . . . .”154 This is especially
true because “a patient can give great weight to a physician’s
statements, not necessarily because the message itself is persuasive
but because the message comes from the trusted medical
authority.”155
When considered in conjunction with North Carolina’s
acknowledgment that the purpose of the speech-and-display provision
is to persuade women to change their minds about abortions,156 the
language of the statute, and the situations it creates, strongly support
the argument that the compelled state message is ideological.
Identifying the message as ideological is a critical step in challenging
the provision’s constitutionality because courts engaging in a First
Amendment analysis give much less weight to a state’s interest in
conveying an ideological viewpoint, as opposed to a state’s interest in
protecting the health of its citizens.157 As the Fourth Circuit
explained:
[W]hile having to choose between blindfolding and earmuffing
herself or watching and listening to unwanted information may
in some remote way influence a woman in favor of carrying the
child to term, forced speech to unwilling or incapacitated
listeners does not bear the constitutionally necessary
connection to the protection of fetal life.158
Therefore, while acknowledging that Casey allows states to
require the transmission of information promoting pro-life choices,
the Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court’s assessment that the
scenario created by the North Carolina speech-and-display provision
went too far: “[b]y requiring providers to deliver this information to a
woman who takes steps not to hear it or would be harmed by hearing
it, the state has . . . moved from ‘encouraging’ to lecturing, using
health care providers as its mouthpiece.”159 The requirement

154. Ellen Camburn, Doctor-Patient-State Relationship: The Problem with Informed
Consent and State Mandated Ultrasounds Prior to Abortions, 10 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 301, 337 (2013) (emphasis added).
155. Robbins, supra note 21, at 164.
156. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 246 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2838
(2015).
157. See Stuart v. Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d 585, 593 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (“Typically, laws
restricting or prohibiting non-misleading commercial speech are subject to intermediate
scrutiny, under which the government must prove that the restriction directly advances
and is narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest.”), aff’d sub nom.
Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2838 (2015).
158. Camnitz, 774 F.3d at 253.
159. Id. (quoting Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 609).

94 N.C. L. REV. 1036 (2016)

1062

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

therefore infringed the physicians’ First Amendment rights by
compelling them to communicate the state’s ideological message, with
no counterbalancing advancement of the state’s alleged interest in
ensuring that women seeking abortions are fully informed of the risks
and alternatives of the procedure.160 The lack of a therapeutic
exception and the fundamentally ideological nature of the state’s
interest in the North Carolina informed consent provision distinguish
it from the Pennsylvania provision upheld in Casey and justify the
Fourth Circuit’s decision to invalidate the law. But beyond the need
to comply with precedent, there is a strong policy reason supporting
the Fourth Circuit’s narrow interpretation of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Casey: the unworkability of a regime of abortion
exceptionalism.
C.

Abortion Exceptionalism Is an Unworkable Doctrine

The Fourth Circuit’s narrow reading of Casey is superior to the
Fifth Circuit’s reading because it avoids giving states the power to
dismantle existing Supreme Court jurisprudence through a series of
increasingly restrictive regulations of abortion procedures. The Fifth
Circuit construes Casey to mean that the undue burden standard must
apply to state regulation of abortion, even when other rights are
implicated.161 Under this reading of Casey, First Amendment
protections simply would not apply to challenges within the abortion
context, meaning that informed consent provisions could only be
struck down as unconstitutional if they impose an undue burden on a
woman’s right to receive an abortion.162 As explained above, the
undue burden standard is often an easy one for state regulations to
meet—most provisions reviewed under this test are likely to be
upheld.163 Eschewing strict or intermediate scrutiny would mean that
160. Id. at 252 (“The woman does not receive the information, so it cannot inform her
decision.”); see also id. at 253 (“We can perceive no benefit to state interests from walling
off patients and physicians in a manner antithetical to the very communication that lies at
the heart of the informed consent process.”).
161. See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 576
(5th Cir. 2012) (“[I]nformed consent laws that do not impose an undue burden on the
woman’s right to have an abortion are permissible if they require truthful, nonmisleading,
and relevant disclosures. Second, such laws are part of the state’s reasonable regulation of
medical practice and do not fall under the rubric of compelling ‘ideological’ speech that
triggers First Amendment strict scrutiny.”).
162. See id.
163. Recall that nearly all the provisions at issue in Casey were upheld when reviewed
under the undue burden standard. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 893–94 (1992) (plurality opinion). Only the spousal requirement was invalidated as an
undue burden. Id. at 895, 898. Despite Casey’s apparent leniency, lower courts have struck
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nearly all state informed consent provisions would pass constitutional
muster, as state regulations would only have to satisfy the much lower
undue burden standard. Proponents of abortion exceptionalism argue
that “[a]bortion is a unique act, fraught with consequences for others,
including both the fetus (or embryo) and society at large[,]”164 and
assert that in recognition of abortion’s uniqueness, the Casey Court
intended the undue burden standard to “occup[y] the field of
constitutional claims whenever an abortion restriction is
challenged.”165
As explained above,166 however, the language of Casey’s analysis
of the informed consent provision appears to be narrowly cabined to
the specifics of the Pennsylvania statute. Moreover, such a
deliberately narrow holding would be in line with the Court’s
approach to abortion laws. As a rule, the Court has generally
employed an incremental approach to abortion in its post-Roe
decisions.167 By avoiding sweeping declarations on controversial
topics such as abortion, the Court generally leaves open issues for
democratic deliberation and avoids handing one side a total victory.168
This is but one practical explanation supporting the Fourth Circuit’s
interpretation of Casey precedent.
Furthermore, reading Casey as setting such a sweeping standard
through its brief consideration of the Pennsylvania informed consent
provisions creates an unworkable jurisprudence. Should Casey be
read as mandating abortion exceptionalism, states would be able to
enact any informed consent requirement, so long as the requirements

down some state abortion regulations. E.g., Planned Parenthood of Wis. v. Schmiel, 806
F.3d 908, 916 (7th Cir. 2015) (invalidating a Wisconsin statute requiring abortion providers
to have admitting privileges at a local hospital as an undue burden); McCormack v.
Herzog, 788 F.3d 1017, 1029 (9th Cir. 2015) (striking down an Idaho law requiring that all
abortions take place in a hospital and prohibiting abortions occurring more than twenty
weeks postfertilization).
164. Reply Brief of Appellants, supra note 38, at 5 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 852).
165. See Borgmann, supra note 12 (describing the displacement of other forms of
analysis in the abortion context as “undue burden preemption”).
166. See supra Section II.A.
167. See, e.g., Markels, supra note 16 (describing the Court’s “still-evolving thinking on
abortion” and noting a “string of Supreme Court rulings that have served to limit [Roe’s]
scope”); cf. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Lets Stand State Rulings Allowing Same-Sex
Marriages, WASH. POST (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law
/supreme-court-lets-stand-state-rulings-allowing-same-sex-marriage/2014/10/06/9991bbb64d89-11e4-aa5e-7153e466a02d_story.html [https://perma.cc/JF9K-JE8X] (noting that the
Supreme Court has a “natural inclination for incremental steps” and explaining that “the
court likes to move slowly when endorsing momentous societal change”).
168. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—Foreword: Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7 (1996).
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did not constitute an undue burden. Under this approach, there
would be no bright-line stopping point to what a state could require.
As one scholar queried, “will North Carolina deem it necessary for a
physician to read all one thousand six hundred and sixty-eight pages
of Williams Obstetrics, a premier text in the field, to a patient 24 hours
before an abortion? After all, doing so would provide truthful, nonmisleading information to patients.”169
Indeed, in the decades following Casey, state legislatures have
capitalized on the weakness of the undue burden test to enact a host
of new regulations restricting access to abortion.170 Scholars point to a
“renaissance”171 of anti-abortion restrictions: from 2011–2014 alone,
state legislatures passed more than two hundred abortion
restrictions.172 The new wave of restrictions includes an increasing
number of informed consent provisions similar to the speech-anddisplay requirement of North Carolina’s WRKA.173 The rise of
speech-and-display provisions174 is part of a strategic shift by pro-life
activists, who have largely departed from the “right to life”
arguments175 familiar from the Roe era and now focus on a woman’s
“right to know” the full implications of her decision to end the
pregnancy. These increasingly prevalent laws have chipped away176 at
the protections to abortion access established in Roe and Casey; the
informed consent provisions impose an increasingly heavy burden on
women seeking abortions and the physicians who perform them.
These laws threaten Casey’s long-standing guarantee that American
women would continue to have access to abortion procedures. Until
169. Bakelaar, supra note 144, at 217.
170. See Mary Ziegler, Redefining Roe: Informed Consent and the Abortion Debate,
JURIST (Jan. 24, 2012), http://jurist.org/forum/2012/01/mary-ziegler-informed-consent.php
[https://perma.cc/6LG9-VRL9].
171. Id.
172. Phil Milford, North Carolina Abortion Law Ruled Unconstitutional, BLOOMBERG
POL. (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2014-12-23/northcarolina-abortion-law-struck-down-as-unconstitutional [https://perma.cc/SF6X-LE3L].
173. Three other states, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas, have passed mandatory
speech-and-display laws. LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.17 (West, Westlaw through the 2015
Reg. Sess.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.2 (West, Westlaw through 1st Sess. of 2015);
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0122 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg.
Sess.). Other states have passed less demanding, but still stringent, informed consent laws.
GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 25, at 1–2; Bakelaar, supra note 144, at 193.
174. In 2013, twenty-seven state legislatures introduced informed consent bills. See
Ziegler, supra note 170.
175. Such arguments focus on abortion’s impact on the fetus, or “the unborn child.”
See, e.g., Discover the Facts, NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE, http://www.nrlc.org/education
[https://perma.cc/4MJZ-W3TM] (teaching about the development of the unborn child,
including “a baby’s first months”).
176. See Ziegler, supra note 170.
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the Supreme Court addresses the lingering uncertainty surrounding
Casey, states will continue to capitalize on the loose language of the
Supreme Court’s holding and will pass ever more restrictive informed
consent provisions.
The Fourth Circuit’s holding in Stuart v. Camnitz sets a higher
bar for the constitutionality of informed consent provisions. This
higher bar ensures that only those informed consent provisions that
truly aim at informing women will stand, and thereby prevents prolife state legislatures from imposing onerous restrictions on women’s
access to abortions through implementation of increasingly
demanding informed consent provisions. Thus, unlike the Fifth and
Eighth Circuits—which would apply an undue burden standard that
would allow nearly all state informed consent requirements to
stand—the Fourth Circuit prevents the holdings of Roe and Casey
from being dismantled by state legislatures.
IV. THE NATION REQUIRES GREATER CLARITY ON THE STANDARD
OF REVIEW FOR INFORMED CONSENT PROVISIONS
The foregoing discussion reveals the lingering confusion about
whether the Supreme Court applied an undue burden test to the
informed consent provisions at issue in Casey. Interestingly, despite
the clear circuit split, the Court has repeatedly declined recent
opportunities to review the issue. In 2013, the Court declined to
review an Oklahoma Supreme Court decision striking down an
abortion statute similar to the North Carolina speech-and-display
provision.177 Further, in June 2015 the Court denied certiorari on
North Carolina Attorney General Roy Cooper’s petition for review
of the Fourth Circuit’s decision on the WRKA.178 Considering the
intensity of the abortion debate and the high importance of the
question of women’s access to abortion, the Court’s approach is
curious. One possible explanation is that the Court is waiting for a
better fact pattern on which to clarify its stance on state regulation of
abortion.179

177. Pruitt v. Nova Health Sys., 134 S. Ct. 617 (2013); see Nicholas Tomsho, Supreme
Court Declines to Hear Oklahoma Abortion Ultrasound Case, JURIST (Nov. 12, 2013),
http://jurist.org/paperchase/2013/11/supreme-court-declines-to-hear-oklahoma-abortionultrasound-case.php [https://perma.cc/4QS8-R2PF].
178. Walker-McGill v. Stuart, 135 S. Ct. 2838, 2838 (2015) (denying review of Stuart v.
Camnitz).
179. See Casey C. Sullivan, SCOTUS Passes on North Carolina’s Abortion Ultrasound
Law, FINDLAW (June 17, 2015, 12:54 PM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/supreme_court/2015
/06/scotus-passes-on-north-carolinas-abortion-ultrasound-law.html [https://perma.cc/8XX7
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Notably, only Justice Scalia indicated that he would be willing to
hear the case, suggesting to some observers that the more liberal
members of the Court preferred to wait before addressing the
abortion issue.180 The fact that the two cases which the Court has
refused to review were ones in which the state regulation of abortion
was struck down, as opposed to upheld, may also be encouraging to
pro-choice advocates.181 Whatever the reason for this reluctance to
tackle the question of the permissible scope of state regulation of
abortion issue,182 the Court should act soon to address the confusion
surrounding Casey. The question of access to abortion is a critical
one, and uncertainty among the lower courts exposes citizens not only
to widely disparate experiences depending on their state of residence,
but also to the danger that state regulation may go too far, trampling
constitutional rights. When the Court does address the issue, it should
follow the Fourth Circuit’s analysis and make clear that challenges to
informed consent provisions are reviewable under a First
Amendment analysis. Such a ruling would place much-needed limits
on the extent to which states can compel physician speech in the
abortion context, and would ensure the continued viability of the
Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
In Casey, the plurality opinion began with the pronouncement,
“[l]iberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.”183 Ironically,
the ensuing holding failed to create a clear standard for abortion laws,
thereby guaranteeing decades of continued doubt about how
stringently states may regulate before crossing the “undue burden”
line. In the decades following Casey, states have aggressively pushed
back against abortion rights by passing a host of ever more restrictive
statutes. With the new focus on women’s “right to know” as opposed
to the fetus’s “right to life,” anti-abortion activists have found

-SGS6] (noting the risks of reading too much into the Court’s denial of certiorari, but
suggesting that it might be “about finding the right vehicle to make an eventual ruling”).
180. See Walker-McGill, 135 S. Ct. at 2838 (noting Justice Scalia as the lone dissenter).
181. See Lyle Denniston, A Gesture in Favor of a Woman’s Abortion Choice,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 15, 2015, 1:29 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/a-gesture-infavor-of-a-womans-abortion-choice/ [https://perma.cc/MBD7-MM6S] (describing the
denial of certiorari as having “the practical effect of leaving undisturbed a lower-court
ruling striking down [the law requiring ultrasound displays] on the premise that it was
‘ideological in intent and in kind’ and thus not a valid form of state regulation of medical
practice”).
182. See Barnes, supra note 167.
183. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
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increased success in the battleground over abortion access. By
holding that there must be some limit on what the state can demand
from physicians in the area of informed consent, the Fourth Circuit
ensures the continuing integrity of Casey and takes a stand in favor of
the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence. Although the Court has
indicated an unwillingness to reopen the abortion issue, it should take
the next opportunity to resolve this circuit split and settle the
lingering uncertainty about how Casey applies in the context of
informed consent requirements. By upholding the Fourth Circuit’s
approach in Stuart v. Camnitz, the Court would provide much-needed
clarity and prevent its abortion jurisprudence from being
incrementally diminished by the continued expansion of informed
consent laws.
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